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### **Recent LinkedIn Posts on Venezuela Post-Maduro (as of 2/24/26)**

#### **Venezuela Post #1 LinkedIn (1/4/26)**

The capture of Nicolas Maduro by US forces has dominated the news cycle over the past twenty-four hours, but this development alone does not alter the serious structural problems facing Venezuela.

Venezuela continues to confront three major, interrelated crises:

- 1) a severe humanitarian crisis;
- 2) a profound contraction of its economy; and
- 3) a sovereign debt overhang of \$150 billion or more.

Fundamentally, progress on any of these fronts will require a Venezuelan government regarded as legitimate and credible by the Venezuelan people and the international community.

#### **Venezuela Post #2 LinkedIn (1/5/26)**

Venezuela had a sovereign debt problem before Maduro's capture, and it still has a huge sovereign debt problem today. Nothing about this past weekend's events changes the underlying financial reality: Venezuela remains one of the most heavily indebted sovereigns in modern history.

With more than \$150 billion in claims across the Republic of Venezuela and its state-owned oil company PDVSA, Venezuela faces the largest and most complex sovereign debt overhang of the last two decades — larger than Argentina or Greece, and far more fragmented than either.

Several factors could make any eventual restructuring extraordinarily difficult:

### 1. A uniquely diverse, large, and uncoordinated creditor body

Bondholders, arbitration award holders, bilateral lenders (notably China and Russia), multilateral institutions, trade creditors, claimants to blocked payments, and holders of promissory notes make for a creditor body more diverse than in any recent sovereign restructuring. Achieving consensus and coordination among these different creditor constituencies could be slow, difficult, and contentious.

### 2. No reliable economic baseline for negotiation

Any restructuring depends on credible projections of future economic growth. But after the dramatic contraction of the Venezuelan economy in recent years, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to generate reliable medium-term growth projections — and therefore hard to predict what Venezuela's debt-repayment capacity will be.

### 3. Bilateral creditors with unclear motivations

China and Russia hold large bilateral claims, but they may not approach a restructuring the way purely commercial creditors do. How they engage with Venezuela — and how a new Venezuelan government engages with them — could have a significant impact on the entire negotiation framework.

### 4. Pending litigation could complicate any eventual Venezuelan debt restructuring

Numerous pending legal actions in various jurisdictions — from arbitration enforcement actions to bondholder claims to PDVSA-related disputes — threaten to attach or carve up assets that might otherwise support a restructuring. This could weaken any future government's negotiating position and reduce the probability of a coherent, comprehensive debt restructuring deal.

The bottom line:

Without a restructuring of its massive sovereign debt burden, Venezuela cannot regain access to international capital markets — and without that access, financing any meaningful economic recovery will be extremely challenging. But no restructuring can begin until there is a legitimate, credible government capable of negotiating with creditors. And, as matters stand today, it looks as if it may be some time before such a government is in place.

**Venezuela Post #3 LinkedIn (1/8/26)**

Venezuela has suffered a seventy-five percent economic contraction over the last decade—alongside soaring inflation, a collapsed currency, and a humanitarian crisis that has left millions of Venezuelans without reliable access to food, medicine, or basic services and necessities. To put this in context, Venezuela has experienced the largest peacetime economic collapse in modern history, far deeper than, for example, the US experienced during the Great Depression of the 1930s or that Greece experienced during the eurozone crisis of the 2010s.

As I noted in comments to International Financing Review earlier this week, any eventual Venezuelan sovereign debt restructuring will be extraordinarily complex and protracted. And as I told Debtwire yesterday, Venezuela cannot simply “flip a switch” to return to producing three million barrels per day of oil from its current production levels of under one million barrels a day.

**Stabilization Before Growth**

Economic and societal recovery begins with restoring basic state capacity and institutions capable of implementing policy—meaning a credible and legitimate government. Investors, domestic and foreign, will require rule of law, predictable institutions, and strong investor protections. Without this foundation, investors will not put new money into Venezuela at scale, and such capital will be an absolute prerequisite for rebuilding the Venezuelan economy.

**Energy — A Finite Runway**

Oil and gas production--traditionally Venezuela's dominant source of export revenues-- must be stabilized and expanded to generate near-term revenues. Yet doing so will require considerable time and billions of dollars of investment--it will not happen overnight. And the ongoing global clean-energy transition means that Venezuela, like other oil-producing countries, is ultimately facing a finite runway for continued hydrocarbon production. Venezuela must therefore use hydrocarbon revenues generated in the coming years to finance the foundations for a more diversified economic and energy future.

**Venezuela Post #4 LinkedIn (1/12/26)**

For decades, Venezuela’s economy has depended overwhelmingly on a single sector — oil and gas — leaving the country vulnerable to price swings, policy mistakes, and weakened institutions. The last post examined the scale of Venezuela’s contraction. This one turns to

the next step: how to rebuild an economy that is broader, more resilient, and capable of sustained growth.

Economic diversification is essential. It is the strategic anchor for any credible recovery — the only way to generate foreign exchange, create the conditions for sustained growth, and reduce Venezuela's long-standing vulnerability to external shocks, policy failures, and institutional weakness

Four priorities define a credible path forward:

### 1. Rebuild the infrastructure that makes diversification possible

Electricity grids, water systems, transportation networks, and digital connectivity have been badly degraded. No modern economy can grow — and no investor or returning Venezuelan can plan for the long term — without reliable infrastructure. Well-structured public-private partnerships (PPPs) can be an effective tool for mobilizing capital and accelerating the rebuilding of essential systems.

### 2. Rationalize the SOE sector

Venezuela has far too many unprofitable state-owned enterprises, and that problem must be confronted directly. Some SOEs still hold assets or capabilities that could support diversification — but only after major restructuring and, where appropriate, transparent and credible privatization. The rest should be liquidated to stop draining fiscal resources and crowding out private investment.

### 3. Human capital: repatriate the millions who have left Venezuela

It has been estimated that roughly eight million Venezuelans have left the country since the start of the crisis. Their return is both a humanitarian imperative for reuniting families and an economic necessity. Diversification cannot succeed without the engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs, and workers who left. A credible repatriation effort must support reintegration and create real economic opportunities.

### 4. Focus on sectors with realistic export and FX-earning potential

Venezuela should lean into areas where it has comparative advantages: agro-processing, logistics, high-end tourism, critical minerals, light manufacturing, alternative energy, and

specialty steel and aluminum products. These sectors can absorb returning workers, attract investment, and generate the foreign exchange needed to stabilize the broader economy.

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Economic recovery is a multi-year, multifaceted project

It starts with a forward-looking economic diversification strategy that rebuilds productive capacity, restores institutional credibility, and lays the basis for long-term, sustainable growth. Within that strategy, the return of millions of Venezuelans is essential — their skills and entrepreneurial capacity are what will allow new sectors to scale and investment to translate into real growth.

### **Venezuela Post #5 LinkedIn (1/27/26)**

A few of the ideas I touched on in the recent [Octus](#) webinar discussion on Venezuela point to just how complex and challenging any future Venezuelan sovereign debt restructuring will be.

First, a restructuring cannot be separated from the broader landscape confronting Venezuela. Any credible process will have to contend with three interlocking realities: 1) a grave humanitarian crisis, 2) a collapsed economy, and 3) a profound governance crisis raising fundamental issues of political legitimacy. These are not background conditions or extraneous concerns — they will set the boundaries of what any restructuring process can realistically achieve.

Second, even the design of value-recovery instruments (VRIs) such as oil-linked warrants that might feature in an eventual restructuring plan must reflect the unique realities of Venezuela's oil sector. Venezuela's production is now only a fraction of what it was twenty-five years ago or even just over ten years ago. A price-only trigger in any oil-linked warrant could end up being meaningless in an environment where high global oil prices coexist with sharply depressed output in Venezuela—a situation the country might still be facing a few years hence.

Any credible oil-linked warrant structure would therefore need to be tied to both price and production volumes, i.e., tied to a concept of total oil revenues. Without a production volume trigger, the oil-linked warrant would fail to capture the Venezuelan oil sector's actual capacity to generate revenues.

Taken together, these points illustrate how any future restructuring will have to be built around Venezuela's underlying realities rather than rely on pre-cooked conceptions or templates.

In the webinar, I was delighted to join esteemed colleagues [Lee Buchheit](#) and [Graham Stock](#), each of whom offered excellent insights and analysis, and our moderator, [Simon Schatzberg](#) (Octus), who skillfully led the discussion.

[Link to Octus webinar video replay:

<https://events.zoom.us/j/9101234567890>]

### **Venezuela Post #6 LinkedIn (2/3/26)**

I was delighted to publish a post in today's edition of the [Oxford Business Law Blog \(OBLB\)](#) on the prospects for a Venezuelan sovereign debt restructuring in a post-Maduro scenario.

Briefly stated, I argue that Maduro's removal does not alter the fundamental challenges facing Venezuela: a grave humanitarian crisis, an economy that has suffered the largest peacetime contraction in recent history, and a massive sovereign debt overhang estimated at more than \$150 billion. Crucially, Venezuela also continues to face an overarching crisis of governmental legitimacy and credibility.

Any eventual Venezuelan sovereign debt restructuring will still confront an array of vexing obstacles that predate Maduro's capture. Venezuela has an extraordinarily diverse and fragmented creditor body, which raises the risk of severe intercreditor tensions and coordination problems during the restructuring process.

Furthermore, any Venezuelan restructuring will confront the difficulty of producing reliable medium-term projections for economic growth and overall oil revenues that must underpin any debt restructuring model for Venezuela. This is particularly true given the collapsed state of Venezuela's economy in general and its oil sector in particular, as well as the inherent volatility of oil prices. Moreover, the presence of China and Russia as Venezuela's largest bilateral creditors is likely to inject a major geopolitical dimension into a Venezuelan debt restructuring.

While Venezuelan bond prices have spiked in the wake of Maduro's capture, a post-Maduro sovereign debt restructuring is still likely to be a protracted and extraordinarily complex process, and Maduro's removal from power does not change that stubborn underlying reality.

[Link to Oxford Business Law Blog post: <https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/oblb/blog-post/2026/02/outlook-restructuring-venezuelas-sovereign-debt-post-maduro> ]

### **Venezuela Post #7 LinkedIn (2/9/26)**

I was delighted that earlier this week [Columbia Law School](#)'s Blue Sky Blog featured my analysis of the prospects for a Venezuelan sovereign debt restructuring in the wake of the capture of Maduro. This analysis was featured last week as well on the [Oxford Business Law Blog](#) (OBLB).

In the post, I discussed the major factors—including an incredibly diverse and large creditor body, the difficulty of developing credible medium-term economic projections for such a troubled economy, and the geopolitical complexities associated with China and Russia being Venezuela's major bilateral creditors—that will make a Venezuelan restructuring so complex and such a protracted process.

I also discussed how the underlying realities facing Venezuela—a humanitarian crisis, a collapsed economy, and a crisis of legitimacy facing its government—have not been altered simply by virtue of Maduro's removal and how these realities will critically affect the prospects for any eventual Venezuelan debt restructuring.

[Link to the CLS Blue Sky Blog post: <https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2026/02/09/the-outlook-for-restructuring-venezuelas-sovereign-debt-after-maduro/> ]

### **Venezuela Post #8 LinkedIn (2/17/26)**

I recently joined [Alex Kasdan](#) of [Expert Webcast](#) for a discussion of Venezuela's economic and legal/policy outlook post-Maduro. We discussed the realities of Venezuela's oil sector, the main driver of the Venezuelan economy, and why oil production in Venezuela cannot simply return to producing three million barrels per day as it was in the early 2000s when current output has recently been under a million barrels per day.

Ramping up Venezuela's oil production will take time—years, not months—and tens of billions, if not hundreds of billions, of dollars of investment. But that investment is not likely to be forthcoming in the immediate future as Venezuela is currently “uninvestable,” as the CEO of ExxonMobil recently put it. In order to attract foreign investment, Venezuela needs a reliable and predictable legal framework, strong investor protections, and political stability.

Venezuela is not the typical country facing a sovereign debt crisis but rather a country with a collapsed economy, an economy that needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. Thus, mere

fiscal consolidation measures, a typical feature of past sovereign debt restructurings, will not suffice to set things straight for the Venezuelan economy.

Instead, Venezuela will require a comprehensive economic reconstruction effort, and a strategy of economic diversification—reducing Venezuela’s overreliance on the oil industry—should be a central component of any such economic reconstruction effort.

[Link for the Expert Webcast video replay is: [https://expertwebcast.com/programs/my-movie-702276?category\\_id=175015](https://expertwebcast.com/programs/my-movie-702276?category_id=175015) ]